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MOBIL OIL CORP. V. UNITED STATES: CAPTIVE




Captive offshore insurance companies are valuable business tools that
offer multinational corporations significant tax and non-tax benefits.' A
captive offshore insurance company is normally an offshore controlled
corporation established by a multinational corporation either to insure
or reinsure the risks of the parent corporation, domestic affiliates, and
foreign affiliates. 2 Although the captive insurance company may be or-
ganized anywhere, it is usually organized in a tax haven country, such
as Bermuda or the Bahamas, to take advantage of lenient tax laws and
minimal insurance regulations.3
The use of a captive insurance company offers the parent corporation
substantial non-tax benefits such as financial, management, and insur-
ance advantages.4 More importantly, however, are the potential tax
benefits associated with captive insurance companies. The parent cor-
* J.D., 1987, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See generally O'Brien & Tung, Captive Off-shore Insurance Companies, 31
INST. ON FED. TAX'N 665 (1973) (discussing captive offshore insurance companies and
their tax benefits); Comment, Federal Taxation Concepts in Corporate Risk Assump-
tion: Self-Insurance, the Trust, and the Captive Insurance Company, 46 FORDHAA L.
REV. 781 (1978) [hereinafter Comment, Concepts] (analyzing captive insurance com-
panies as an alternative to self-insurance and trusts as tools available to a corporation
to effectively protect itself from risks).
2. Saggese, Utilization of a Foreign Captive Insurance Corporation, 644 INS. LJ.
525, 525 (1976). See generally 1 E. OWENS, INTERNATIONAL ASPEC S OF U.S. INCOME
TAXATiON, PART Two: 43-44 (1980) (describing foreign corporations as corporations
incorporated outside of the United States).
3. See Note, Revenue Ruling 77-316 and Carnation Co. v. Commissioner: An
Analysis of the Attack on Captive Offshore Insurance Companies, 2 VA. TAX REV.
111, 111 (1982) (discussing tax and non-tax advantages of offshore insurance opera-
tions); see also infra note 17 (discussing Bermuda tax laws and insurance regulations).
See generally Saggese, supra note 2 (discussing the attraction of multinational corpo-
rations to Bermuda for establishment of foreign captive insurance corporations).
4. See O'Brien & Tung, supra note 1, at 667 (discussing business and tax advan-
tages of captive offshore insurance companies). See generally Tinsley, Why Revenue
Ruling 77-316 is Wrong: A Captivating Argument, 9 J. CORP. TAX'N 142 (1982) (stat-
ing that faults in the reasoning of Revenue Ruling 77-316 detracted from its credibil-
ity); Pine, The Case for 'Captive' Insurers, HARv. Bus. REV. Nov.-Dec. 1972, at 142,
143 (discussing the many benefits of establishing a captive insurance company).
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poration's insurance premiums paid to the captive insurance company
are deductible pursuant to section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code as
a normal and necessary business expense. Therefore, the significant
tax and non-tax benefits render captive insurance companies popular
insurance techniques."
During the 1970's, Revenue Ruling 77-3167 and the United States
Tax Court holding in Carnation Co. v. Commissioner8 restricted the
deductibility of insurance premiums paid to certain captive insurance
companies. The Internal Revenue Service and the Tax Court deter-
mined that a corporation's premiums to its captive insurance company
constituted a payment from a member of the same economic family
and created an invalid insurance contract. 9
The economic family analysis conflicts with the separate corporate
identity doctrine. 10 The separate corporate identity doctrine states that
despite the captive insurance company status as a subsidiary of the in-
sured parent corporation, the captive insurance company and its parent
are two separate and distinct corporations." The economic family anal-
ysis, however, assumes that a parent corporation cannot transfer the
risk of loss to a subsidiary captive insurance company.
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States 2 the United States Claims
5. I.R.C. § 162 (West 1986); see infra note 26 (setting forth the contents of section
162).
6. See Note, supra note 3, at 111 (describing the various tax and non-tax benefits
derived from offshore captive insurance companies).
7. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53. See generally M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACnCE
AND PROCEDURE, 3-16 - 3-17 (1981) (reciting the use and applicability of Revenue
Rulings). Revenue rulings are interpretations and applications of the tax laws by the
Internal Revenue Service. The rulings are applied to specific sets of facts to advise
others on substantive tax issues. Id. Rulings, however, do not have the force and effect
of the Internal Revenue Code or Treasury Regulations. Id. Instead, the rulings are
drawn from letter rulings provided to taxpayers, technical advice to district offices,
studies undertaken by the Assistant Commissioner, court decisions, suggestions from
tax practitioner groups, and publications. Id. Their precedential value, therefore, is lim-
ited to situations where the facts are substantially the same as those set forth in the
ruling. Id.
8. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1978), aff'd, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
9. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54; see also Carnation Co. v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. 400, 409 (applying a risk-shifting analysis similar to that found in Revenue
Ruling 77-316), affid, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
There were no valid insurance payments because no risk of loss shifted within the in-
sured corporation. The risk of loss must shift between the insured and insurer for a
business expense deduction to be valid. Id.
10. See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text (developing a description of the
corporate entity doctrine).
11. See infra notes 73-88 and accompanying text (discussing the separate corporate
entity doctrine).
12. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985).
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Court adopted the economic family analysis, disallowing captive insur-
ance company tax benefits to a parent corporation.' 3 If a parent corpo-
ration wishes to continue claiming income tax deductions for premiums
paid to a captive insurance company, its captive insurance company
must conform to the standards enunciated in Mobil Oil."' The Claims
Court, however, did not reconcile its opinion with the separate corpo-
rate entity doctrine.
This note posits that the economic family analysis, incorrectly ig-
nores many valid business reasons to operate captive insurance compa-
nies. 15 Section One describes the elements of a captive insurance com-
pany and discusses the arguments supporting and rejecting a captive's
use. Section Two outlines the deductibility of premiums paid to captive
insurance companies through the economic family analysis. Section
Three discusses the corporate entity doctrine and its relevance to cap-
tive insurance companies. Section Four details the courts' treatment of
captive insurance companies, analyzing the cases leading up to United
States v. Mobil Oil Corp. Section Five describes the Mobil Oil decision
and Section Six concludes that the court failed to reconcile its adoption
of the economic family analysis with the separate corporate identity
doctrine.
I. ELEMENTS OF CAPTIVE OFFSHORE INSURANCE
COMPANIES
A. STRUCTURE OF CAPTIVE OFFSHORE INSURANCE COMPANIES
A parent corporation forms a captive insurance company as its sub-
sidiary.16 Normally, the parent incorporates a captive insurance com-
pany in a foreign jurisdiction that maintains lenient laws concerning
the regulation and taxation of insurance companies. 17 After a captive
13. Id. at 568.
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 152-71 and accompanying text (stating that the separate corpo-
rate identity doctrine should be employed to determine risk shifting rather than the
economic family test).
16. See Comment, Concepts, supra note 1, at 811 (discussing the relationship be-
tween captive insurance companies and parent corporations).
17. See generally 1 D. DIAMOND & W. DIAMOND, TAX HAVENS OF THE WORLD
(1986) (discussing tax exemptions and reductions and investment and capital incentives
for foreign captive insurance companies in Bermuda). In Bermuda, for example, there
is no income tax or capital gains tax. Id. at 1. Also, there are no taxes on dividends
paid in or remitted from Bermuda. Id.
The only tax payable is in the form of a government fee of $1,200 payable on incor-
poration and $1,200 paid annually by all exempted companies. See B. SPITZ, TAx
HAVENs ENCYCLOPEDIA 4 (1983) (discussing the legal status of and procedure for ex-
empted and non-resident corporations in Bermuda). Each fee, however, increases to
19871
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insurance company is incorporated, its parent contributes to the captive
insurance company's capital. 18 To carry out the capitalization the par-
ent transfers cash assets to the captive insurance company."9 Following
the capitalization, the parent either directly insures itself through the
captive insurance company, or acquires an insurance policy from an
unaffiliated insurance company that reinsures the majority of the risk
of the parent's risk with the captive insurance company.
20
$2,500 in the case of insurance companies. D. DIAMOND & W. DIAMOND, supra, at
Bermuda 2.
Exempted companies are companies incorporated in Bermuda transacting business
elsewhere in the world. B. SPITZ, supra, at BE2. An exempted company is entitled
under the Exempted Undertakings Tax Protection Act to special protection from the
Bermuda government. D. DIAMOND & W. DIAMOND, supra, at Bermuda 1. The Act
provides that if the government should ever impose any tax on profits, income, capital
assets, gains, or appreciation such taxes will not be applicable to an authorized com-
pany until March 28, 2006. Id.
Besides the absence of income taxation, Bermuda maintains minimal regulations
concerning insurance companies. On July 7, 1978, the Bermuda Insurance Act of 1978
was passed (effective February 1980) regulating insurance business practiced in Ber-
muda. Id. at 10. It applies to local insurance companies, non-resident insurance compa-
nies, and exempted insurance companies. B. SPITZ, supra, at BE2. Of these three cat-
agories, captives are a form of exempted insurance companies. Id.
For a captive insurance company to engage in business from within Bermuda, it first
must register with the Minister of Finance as both an insurance company and a corpo-
ration. Id. After registration it is required that all registered insurance companies
maintain a principal office and representative in Bermuda. Id. Each of these insurance
companies also must file an annual financial return with the Registrar of Companies to
serve as a short summary of the insurance company's accounts. Id.
The Insurance Act requires corporations forming captive insurance companies in
Bermuda to demonstrate that the insurance company will be able to conduct a legiti-
mate insurance business. D. DIAMOND & W. DIAMOND, supra, at Bermuda 10. To
demonstrate the captive insurance company's legitimacy, the captive's assets must ex-
ceed liabilities by the amounts specified in the regulations. Id. If such a surplus is not
maintained, the captive will be declared insolvent and will be forced to close its busi-
ness. Id.
Paid-in capital to the captive insurance companies also is governed by the Insurance
Act. Id. The paid-in capital of captive must be at least $120,000 for general business,
$250,000 for long-term business, and $370,000 for both types of business. Id. In addi-
tion, the Bermuda Insurance Act does not specifically mention that a captive must
maintain a premium to surplus ratio as required in American jurisdictions. Id.
18. See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text (describing the methods Mobil
Oil used to make capital contributions to its newly-created captive insurance company).
19. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text (discussing the capitalization pro-
cess of the captive insurance company in Carnation Co. v. Commissioner).
20. See generally S. KIMBALL & W. PFENNIGSTORF, THE REGULATION OF INSUR-
ANCE COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY 40 (1981) (discussing special rules for reinsurers licensed in the
United States). This differs from the typical insurance process where an insured has a
direct insurance policy with an insurer. Id.
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B. PURPOSES AND BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING CAPTIVE OFFSHORE
INSURANCE COMPANIES
A parent creates a captive insurance company to reduce insurance
costs and to increase insurance coverage.2 1 Normally, reduced insur-
ance cost means reduced insurance coverage. 22 Captive insurance com-
panies, however, reverse this trend, allowing an insured to reduce insur-
ance costs and simultaneously increase its insurance coverage.2 3
Many major corporations operate some form of captive insurance
system to insure the parent corporation's risks and take advantage of
the significant economic benefits.24 Benefits are classified into two cate-
gories, either tax or non-tax benefits. The potential tax benefits of es-
tablishing a captive insurance company are of great importance to
many corporations. These benefits originate in the Internal Revenue
Code, section 162.25 Section 162 designates insurance premiums as po-
tential deductible expenses. 26 A business expense, like an insurance pre-
mium, is deductible if it is incurred in the trade or business, is not a
capital expenditure, and is ordinary and necessary.27
Many corporations organize captive offshore insurance subsidiaries
for sound non-tax business reasons. 28 Their reasons include: (a) lower
21. Comment, Concepts, supra note 1, at 811; see D. DIAMOND & W. DIAMOND,
supra note 17, at Bermuda 4-5 (listing tax and non-tax benefits available to offshore
insurance operations).
22. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 556-63 (1985) (analyzing
Mobil Oil's problem of facing rising insurance costs to cover its risks and a need to
reduce insurance costs to reduce expenditures). In an insurance contract, an insurer
and potential insured determine a premium the insured must pay in order to receive
insurance for some future loss. W. VANCE & B. ANDERSON, VANCE ON INSURANCE,
65-66 (1964). This premium is determined so that the insured's premium reflects the
probability of loss in conjunction with the total property insured. Id. at 67. Therefore,
if an insured's property's value is high, the insured will pay higher premiums to insure
the property. Id.
23. Comment, Concepts, supra note 1, at 811.
24. See D. DIAMOND & W. DIAMOND, supra note 17, at Bermuda 3-5 (acknowl-
edging that the multitude of benefits available to offshore insurance operations inspired
many American corporations to create their own captive insurance companies).
25. I.R.C. § 162 (West 1986).
26. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 1986) (stating that "there shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business"); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1 (1975)
(including in the definition of business expenses: management expenses, commissions,
labor, supplies, incidental repairs, operating expenses of automobiles used in the trade
or business, traveling expenses while away from home solely in the pursuit of a trade or
business, advertising, and other selling expenses, together with insurance premiums
against fire, storm, theft, accident, or other similar loss in the case of a business, and
rental for the use of a business property).
27. 2 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) D 162, 1330.015 (1986).
28. See generally Pine, supra note 4 (describing a captive insurance company, with
adequate premium income, that has the ability to reduce corporate insurance expenses
19871
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insurance premiums,29 (b) freedom from domestic statewide regulations
affecting the captive's operations and portfolio investments, 0 (c) cen-
tralization of worldwide insurance coverage for multinational corpora-
tions, 31 (d) coverage of commercially uninsurable risks,32 (e) centrali-
zation of corporate funds for investment expansion,33 (f) greater
flexibility in creating unique insurance policies,3 4 and (g) greater acces-
sibility to international reinsurance markets. 5
A party enters into an insurance contract to indemnify against loss,
damage, or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event.30
without the loss of underwriting profits or investment income).
29. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 557 (1985) (acknowledg-
ing the cost savings to Mobil Oil for using a captive insurance company for insurance
purposes).
30. See S. IMBALL & W. PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 20, at 40 (noting that control
of reinsurance by the states within the United States is limited). The transaction be-
tween the direct insurer, which may itself be a foreign insurer, and the reinsurer, often
takes place outside the state where the insured risk is located. Consequently, the state
is concerned less in this case than in the case of a direct insurance transaction. Id.
31. See generally id. at 21 (portraying American insurance law as inconsistent and
minimally coherent, resulting in poorly structured American insurance regulations that
prompt corporations to insure all of their risks in a jurisdiction with predictable laws
and standards).
32. O'Brien & Tung, supra note I, at 668. For companies operating in high hazard
industries such as airline, oil, and chemical companies, insurance premiums are much
higher than for low risk companies. Id. at 667. Consequently, companies in high hazard
industries are forced to use another means of insuring risks because complete risk
transfer to an unrelated insurer is often impossible. See Mobil-Oil Corp. v. United
States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 557 (1985) (noting that Mobil Oil incorporated a captive insur-
ance company to provide fuller insurance coverage in light of the high risks involved
with the oil business).
33. O'Brien & Tung, supra note 1, at 668. The captive insurance company may
lend the capital received as premium payments back to the parent or subsidiary at low
interest rates. Through this practice, a corporation has more funds at its disposal for
investment purposes. Id. Such investment purposes include reinvestment in the corpora-
tion or investments outside of the corporation. Id. The central fact is that the same
monies are used twice: once to pay an insurance premium, and again for investment.
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 559-60 (1985) (finding that at
least 50 percent of the money held by Mobil Oil's captive as insurance premiums and
insurance reserves was recommitted to Mobil Oil interests).
34. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 557 (1985) (recognizing
that Mobil Oil's use of a captive insurance company was due in part to the need for
different types of insurance coverage to centralize its risk management schedule).
35. O'Brien & Tung, supra note 1, at 668. By gaining access to the international
reinsurance market, the captive further reinsures the parent's policy. Id. The captive
may buy such an international reinsurance policy at wholesale rates. Id. Although cost
savings in this area are not guaranteed, more flexibility is permitted in creating an
insurance policy to fit the needs of the parent corporation. See Mobil Oil Corp. v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 557 (1985) (noting that Mobil Oil incorporated its cap-
tive insurance company to provide more flexible insurance coverage to itself and its
affiliates).
36. See United States v. Newton Livestock Auction Mkt., Inc., 336 F.2d 673, 676
(10th Cir. 1964) (defining insurance as a contractual relationship between an insurer
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The courts interpret section 162 to hold that a party cannot deduct as
business expenses funds set aside in anticipation of losses, such as self-
insurance reserves, because establishing liability has yet to occur.3" The
Internal Revenue Service agreed with the courts and set forth Revenue
Ruling 69-512, disallowing deductions for self-insurance reserves.ec
Therefore, to deduct insurance payments a party must make these pay-
ments to another party covering an identifiable risk.3" This constitutes
the risk shifting concept.40
A parent corporation establishes a captive insurance company to sat-
isfy Revenue Ruling 69-512. The Internal Revenue Service, however,
attacks the deductibility of premiums paid to captive insurance compa-
nies, arguing that no risk shifts when a parent corporation pays a pre-
mium to its subsidiary.
II. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE APPROACHES
DEDUCTING INSURANCE PREMIUMS PAID TO CAPTIVE
OFFSHORE INSURANCE COMPANIES
A. INSURANCE PREMIUMS
The Internal Revenue Service viewed captive insurance companies as
a means for a corporation to exaggerate their business expense deduc-
tions. In response to the growth of foreign captive insurance compa-
and insured whereby the insured's risk of loss shifts to the insurer); W. VANCE & B.
ANDERSON, VANCE ON INSURANCE 82 (1964) (defining a contract of insurance as "any
contract by which one of the parties for a valuable consideration, known as a premium,
assumes the risk of loss or liability that rests upon the other").
37. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 78, 79-80 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 654 (1931). The court distinguished between insurance premiums and
payments to a self-insurance reserve, noting that the whole object of self-insurance is to
avoid the expense of insurance premiums. Id. If a taxpayer elects to insure its risks
with a private insurance company, it will pay a premium in order to shift the risk. Id.
at 80. If a taxpayer elects not to expend a premium, it cannot charge a corresponding
sum as an expense because it retained the risk and kept the premium. Id. Expenses
incurred and deductible are sums paid, not amounts set aside for protection. Id.; see
also Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 1978)
(prohibiting deductions for payments to a self-insurance fund).
38. Rev. Rul. 69-512, 1969-2 C.B. 24 (holding that reserves established for self-
insurance are not ordinary and necessary expenses paid in the course of carrying on a
business and therefore, not deductible).
39. Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 279, 280 (5th Cir. 1978)
(stating that only through a payment to an insurer is liability shifted from the insured
party to the insurer). The payment from party A to party B to protect party A from an
identifiable risk constitutes an essential element of insurance. Id. This differs from the
self-insurance system where insurance payments are retained by the insured party. Id.
40. See infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text (describing risk shifting as de-
fined for insurance purposes).
1987]
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nies4 the Internal Revenue Service developed the idea that insurance
premiums paid by a parent to a captive insurance corporation are not
deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.42 Seeking to
deny corporations this tax deduction, the Internal Revenue Service
used the risk shifting doctrine to attack the deduction of premiums
paid to captive insurance companies.'3
B. RISK SHIFTING
For federal tax purposes, the concept of defining insurance as a
transfer of risk began with the Supreme Court's decision in Helvering
v. Le Gierse. 4 In Le Gierse, the respondent received proceeds from a
decedent's life insurance and annuity contracts.'5 Pursuant to the tax
code in effect at the time, proceeds from insurance were excluded from
the estate tax. To avoid paying taxes, the respondent attempted to clas-
sify the life insurance and annuity contract proceeds as insurance.46
The Supreme Court held that if the insurance policy in question did
not involve risk shifting, no insurance exists.47 Viewing the life insur-
ance policy and annuity contract together, the Supreme Court found no
risk transferred.' 8
Although Le Gierse defined insurance in the context of life insurance
policies and annuity contracts, the Internal Revenue Service applied
this definition of insurance to determine the tax consequences for insur-
41. D. DIAMOND & W. DIAMOND, supra note 17, at Bermuda 1-3. It was reported
that in 1978, Bermuda alone has over 700 captive offshore insurance companies and
this increase came after a growth of almost 400 companies over the past four years. Id.
In addition, the 700 captive insurance companies present in 1978 were writing approxi-
mately 2.5 billion dollars in premiums. Bergson, Captive Insurers Slip Their Chains,
N.Y. Times, July 16, 1978, § 3 at 1, col. 1. By the end of 1985, the premium value of
Bermuda foreign-based insurance companies was expected to exceed 9.5 billion dollars,
and this figure represents approximately thirty-five percent of the island's national
product. D. DIAMOND & W. DIAMOND, supra note 17, at Bermuda 9.
42. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54.
43. See O'Brien & Tung, supra note 1, at 674-92 (discussing various approaches
available to the Internal Revenue Service to rebut the legitimacy of deductions for
insurance premiums paid to captive insurance companies).
44. Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
45. Id. at 537.
46. See id. at 538-39 (noting that the tax code at the time of this case had never
defined insurance in this context, forcing the Supreme Court to develop such a
definition).
47. Id. at 536-37.
48. See id. at 539 (stating that historically and in common practice, insurance in-
volves risk shifting and risk distribution); see also Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71
T.C. 400, 408 (1978), affid, 640 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965
(1981) (noting the importance of Helvering v. Le Gierse in the creation of the risk
shifting definition of insurance and that any type of annuity or insurance agreement
must be scrutinized to determine if risk shifting is present).
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ing through a captive insurance company. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice clarified its position in Revenue Ruling 60-275,4o stating that to
deduct an insurance premium as a business expense under section 162,
the premium must be paid pursuant to a "true" insurance contract. 0
Revenue Ruling 60-275 permits deducting an insurance premium if
paid to an unafflliated insurance company or similarly unrelated body
and if it shifts the risk from the insured party.5 ' Therefore, a taxpayer
who sets aside money equivalent to an insurance premium for self-in-
surance cannot deduct the set aside as an expense paid or incurred.
2
The Internal Revenue Service treated payments to a captive insur-
ance company not as premiums but as non-deductible capital contribu-
tions from the parent corporation to the subsidiary captive insurance
company. In effect, the Internal Revenue Service viewed payments to a
captive insurance company, wholly-owned by the parent corporation,
indistinguishable from payments made to a self-insurance reserve. 3
49. Rev. Rul. 60-275, 1960-2 C.B. 43.
50. See id. at 45 (stating that a "true" insurance contract may exist only if risk
shifting is present).
51. Id.
52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a) (1975) (defining insurance company for federal
income tax purposes). For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, an insurance com-
pany is defined as:
A company whose primary purpose during the taxable year is the issuing of
insurance or annuity contracts or the reinsuring of risks underwritten by insur-
ance companies. Though subject to state laws, it is the character of the business
actually done on the taxable year which determines whether a company is taxa-
ble as an insurance company under the Internal Revenue Code.
Id. In addition, a business enterprise has three methods of protecting itself from risks:
retain the risks by using a form of self-insurance, prevent the formation of risks and
transfer the risks by use of an insurance policy. O'Brien & Tung, supra note 1. at 681.
53. Rev. Rul. 60-275, 1960-2 C.B. 43, 45. But see I.R.C. § 269(a) (West 1985)
(presenting an alternate approach towards disallowing deductions paid as premiums to
captive insurance companies). Section 269 states:
If any corporation acquires the property of another corporation, such property
not being controlled immediately before the acquisition by the acquiring corpora-
tion, with the principal purpose in mind to evade Federal income tax by securing
the benefit of a deduction, credit, or other allowance which such person or corpo-
ration would not otherwise enjoy, then the Secretary may disallow such deduc-
tion, credit, or other allowance.
Id.; Internal Revenue Service, Captive Offshore Insurance or Reinsurance Companies,
2 INT. REV. MAN-AUDIT, (CCH) D 8215-2 (1980) (directing auditors to disallow
deductions for premiums paid foreign captives by virtue of sections 482 and 269).
The court in Alinco Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 336 (Ct. Cl. 1967)
discounted this analysis of captive insurance companies. Alinco involved a reinsurance
relationship between a primary insurer and Alinco, where Alinco reinsured eighteen
percent of the primary insurer's risks. Id. at 239. The court concluded that several
valid business motives supported the creation of Alinco and did not accept a section
269 approach towards the deductibility of insurance premiums retained by Alinco. See
id. at 343 (holding that even a major motive to reduce taxes will not vitiate an other-
wise valid and real business transaction).
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The Internal Revenue Service used the economic family analysis to
determine that a parent corporation's payment to a captive insurance
company did not constitute risk shifting. Revenue Ruling 77-316,51 first
setting forth the economic family analysis, analyzed three scenarios for
a corporation to establish a captive insurance company.55 The Internal
Revenue Service concluded that in all three scenarios the risk of loss
did not shift from the parent corporation to the captive insurance com-
pany.56 Therefore, without insurance per se the premium payments
were not deductible.
57
The Alinco parent corporation successfully demonstrated valid non-tax purposes for
operating a captive insurance company. See id. at 345 (stating that because Alinco
demonstrated sufficient business purposes, Alinco should not be subject to section 269
for tax advantages that also flowed from the same transaction). Assuming such pur-
poses are demonstrable, the Internal Revenue Service must show then that tax avoid-
ance is the captive's primary purpose. See id. at 341 (discussing the Internal Revenue
Service contention that the principle purpose in the transaction described in this case
was tax avoidance). The decision in Alinco made the Internal Revenue Service's attack
on section 269 less viable, thus lightening the burden on captive insurance companies.
Id.
54. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54 (noting that, pursuant to Section 162, the
Internal Revenue Service considered whether premiums paid by the parent corporation
and its subsidiaries to a wholly-owned captive insurance company were deductible as
business expenses).
55. Id. at 54. In the first scenario corporation X organized a wholly-owned foreign
insurance subsidiary known as S1. Id. at 53-54. X contracted with SI to insure the
properties and risks of X and its domestic subsidiaries. Premiums from this insurance
contract reflected standard commercial insurance rates and flowed directly to SI. The
S1 captive insured no other risks, apart from those of X and its subsidiaries. Id.
The facts in the second scenario parallel those in the first except that X paid insur-
ance premiums to cover its risks and properties to M, an unrelated domestic insurance
company. Id. at 54. X entered into an insurance arrangement with M under a contract
which provided that M would reinsure 95% of the risks with 52, the wholly-owned
foreign insurance captive of X. In the contractual agreement between S2 and M, M
maintained its primary insurer position as to X. Id.
The final scenario is comprised of many of the same facts as in the first scenario. Id.
In this case, however, X paid insurance premiums to its wholly-owned foreign insur-
ance subsidiary known as S3. S3 entered into a contract with W, an unrelated insur-
ance company. Under this contract, 53 agreed to transfer 90% of the risk to W through
reinsurance agreements. Id.
Using these scenarios, the Internal Revenue Service delivered its opinion concerning
the deductibility of premiums paid to captive insurance companies that is still the stan-
dard today. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that amounts paid to S1, S2, and 53 as
insurance premiums when retained by these captives, are not deductible as valid busi-
ness expenses under section 162. Id.
56. Id. at 54-55. In all three captive insurance scenarios, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice determined that the parent corporation and its captive insurance company subsidi-
ary were members of a single economic family. Id. Because these corporations were
within the same economic family, any insurable loss incurred by the parent corporation
would ultimately be borne by the parent corporation. Id. The premium payments to the
captive insurance company were interpreted as transfers of capital from a parent corpo-
ration to its subsidiary. Id. Therefore, there was no risk shifting. Id.
57. Id. at 53-54. The amounts not insured by S2 in scenario 2 (5%), and the
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The economic family"8 analysis asserts that movements of cash
among an economic family comprised of closely held corporations'" are
essentially movements of cash among one corporate network.60 In Rev-
enue Ruling 77-316's three scenarios, the parent corporation that
formed the captive insurance company was ultimately responsible for
its loss because the money used to cover the loss came from within the
corporate network. Therefore, according to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, the risk of loss was not transferred from one separate entity to
another but from one part of a separate entity to another part.
Revenue Ruling 77-316 states a valid insurance contract exists only
when the risk of loss shifts to an unrelated party. Divided into five fac-
tors, the economic family analysis determines whether the insurer and
the insured are unrelated parties.
Factor one evaluates whether the captive insurance company main-
tains adequate capitalization."' If a captive insurance company does
not have the financial capacity to cover losses, arising from a parent
corporation's or its subsidiaries' claims, then no risk transfers. Further,
the captive insurance company must possess sufficient financial re-
sources to fulfill its contractual obligations. Otherwise, the parent cor-
poration reimburses itself for its losses, and the insurance contract is
illusory.62
Factor two evaluates whether the captive insurance company main-
tains a level of capitalization and assets consistent with the risks in-
sured. 63 Low capitalization raises questions concerning a captive's via-
amount transferred by S3 in scenario 3 (90%), are deductible under Section 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing deducti-
ble insurance costs of Section 162). Because these amounts are no longer in the eco-
nomic control of X and represent a distribution of a percentage of the risk to unrelated
insurers, they are considered paid or incurred pursuant to Section 162. Rev. Rul. 77-
316, C.B. 53, 54.
58. See generally Note, Revenue Ruling 77-316, supra note 3, at 111 (classifying
captive offshore insurance companies, subsidiaries, and the parent as one economic
family and therefore, unable to properly distribute the risk of loss).
59. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 694 (3d ed. 1983)
(defining a closely held corporation as one whose shares are held by either a single
shareholder or a closely knit group of shareholders).
60. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 55.
61. See Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400, 409 (1978), afr'd, 640 F.2d
1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (stating that a focal point in the
case was Carnation's promise to provide $3 million for capitalization of its captive in-
surance company).
62. See Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 833, 838 (D. Colo.
1984), affid, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding that if the insurance agreements
do not shift the risk of loss, evidenced by proper capitalization of the captive insurance
company, the insurance agreement is invalid for federal tax purposes).
63. See N.Y. INs. LAW § 47 (McKinney 1985) (establishing as a minimum capital-
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bility as a valid insurance company." To eliminate these questions, a
captive's capitalization must comply with current insurance company
standards.65
Factor three evaluates whether the captive protects its solvency
through procurement of reinsurance.66 Reinsurance supports the cap-
tive insurance company's position as a bona fide insurance company. °
Furthermore, reinsurance makes the captive insurance company's risk
consistent with its premiums and capital position. Acting as a bona fide
insurance company and not as a tool of the parent corporation, the cap-
tive insurance company exists outside the parent corporation's eco-
nomic family. This analysis supports the conclusion that the risk of loss
transfers from the parent corporation to the captive insurance
company.68
Factor four evaluates whether the premium the captive charges puts
the captive and the parent corporation in a market relationship. 6 If the
insurance premiums the parent corporation pays to the captive insur-
ance company force the captive insurance company to operate at a loss,
the captive may be viewed as part of the parent's economic family.
0 If
operating at a profit, however, the captive insurance company operates
in a market relationship with the parent and therefore exists outside
the parent's economic family.
Finally, factor five evaluates whether the captive insurance company
controls its assets. 1 If the parent or its subsidiaries may withdraw the
premiums payable to the captive insurance company, these premiums
ization requirement that no insurer expose itself to a loss on any risk exceeding ten
percent of its surplus to policy holders).
64. See infra note 160 and accompanying text (setting forth the importance of ade-
quately capitalizing a corporation).
65. Id.
66. See Kloman, Captive Insurance Companies-1977, 4 RISK MGMT. REP. 6, 6
(1977) (discussing, as being indicative of the captive's economic independence, in-
stances in which an unrelated insurance company is willing to offer coverage to the
captive).
67. Id. at 6. It is customary for insurance companies to acquire reinsurance for
risks already insured. Therefore, if the captive insurance company actively seeks rein-
surance, it is demonstrating that it is acting in the normal fashion for an insurance
company. Id.
68. If the captive insurance company is operating at a loss, it may appear that the
parent corporation is maintaining the captive solely for insurance tax benefits. The
presence of profits, however, may be deceptive if the parent maintains control over the
captive's assets.
69. See Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(d)(3) (1975) (finding a market relationship if the pre-
mium actually charged is identical to the premium charged in a transaction between
two unrelated parties under similar circumstances).
70. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54.
71. Id. at 55.
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become a tool for transferring assets within the economic family. The
economic family retains the funds rather than shifting them to a body
outside the family. Therefore, the risk does not transfer.72 Use of the
economic family analysis, however, ignores the implications of the cor-
porate entity doctrine.
III. THE CORPORATE ENTITY DOCTRINE
A. PRINCIPLES OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY DOCTRINE
The corporate entity doctrine posits that affiliated corporations are
entities wholly independent of their shareholders for tax purposes
rather than groups dependent upon the identity and behavior of the
shareholders.7 3 According to this doctrine, a subsidiary corporation is
considered an independent entity for federal income tax purposes."
The doctrine asserts that corporations are independent tax paying enti-
ties for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code and unaffected by the
identity and principal characteristics of its shareholders.7 5 This rule
was set forth by the Supreme Court in Moline Properties, Inc. v.
Commissioner.6
In Moline Properties, the corporation's sole stockholder of a corpora-
tion attempted to report the gains from a sale of the corporation's real
estate as his own.7 7 The corporation maintained no books or bank ac-
counts under the corporate name.78 In accordance with the corporate
entity doctrine, the Court considered the corporation a separate taxable
72. See Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941) (requiring the risk to trans-
fer); Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 55 (stipulating that risk must transfer).
73. See generally B. BIrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOiME TAXATION OF COR-
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, D 1.05, 1-14-1-22 (4th ed. 1979) (analyzing the cor-
porate entity doctrine and stating that, in general, the corporation is treated as an
independent tax-paying entity by the Internal Revenue Service, unaffected by the per-
sonal characteristics of its shareholders).
74. See Raffety Farms, Inc. v. United States, 511 F.2d 1234, 1235 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 834 (1975) (recognizing independent entity status despite the use of
corporate form to avoid a foreign law, and stressing that if the corporation is used to
serve the "creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, but such purpose is equivalent
of business activity or it is followed by carrying on of business, then the corporation
remains a separate taxation unit").
75. B. BITrKER & J. EusncE, supra note 73, at 1-14.
76. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943). In this
case, an individual created a corporation to be used as a security device in connection
with certain realty he owned. Id. at 437. A portion of his property assigned within the
corporation was leased for use as a parking lot. Id. at 438. The individual tried to claim
the profit from the lease as gain on his individual return, but the Supreme Court ruled
against him. Id. at 441.
77. Id. at 438.
78. Id.
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entity.7 19 Although the corporation remains a tool of the stockholder,
under the corporate entity doctrine it still retains a separate identity."0
The corporate entity rule, however, is not absolute. In some cases,
the substance of a corporation's transactions control over the form. Ac-
cordingly, the Internal Revenue Code contains various exceptions to the
corporate entity rule.81 To determine whether a transaction between a
parent corporation and its subsidiary is between two separate corpora-
tions, a court should examine several factors.82 If it appears that the
subsidiary is not engaged in some independent industrial, commercial,
79. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943). The
Court described the separate corporate entity doctrine as fulfilling a useful purpose in
business life. Id. Whether the purpose is to: gain an advantage under the law of the
state of incorporation, comply with the demands of creditors, serve the creator's per-
sonal, or undisclosed convenience, as long as that purpose is the equivalent of business
activity, or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corpora-
tion remains a separate taxable entity. Id.; see also National Carbide Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 336 U.S. 422, 430 (1949) (determining that corporate ownership and the
control incident to it has no different tax consequences when clothed in the garb of
agency than when worn as a removable corporate veil).
80. Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439 (1943). As long as
the purpose of incorporation is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by the
carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation remains a separate taxable
entity. Id.
81. B. BITTKER & J. EusTICE, supra note 73, 1-15; see I.R.C. § 269 (West 1985)
(disallowing certain tax benefits if control of a corporation is acquired for the principal
purpose of tax avoidance); I.R.C. § 531 (West 1986) (imposing an additional tax on
corporations formed for the purpose of avoiding income tax on its shareholders by ac-
cumulating rather than distributing its earnings); I.R.C. § 341(e)(5)(A) (West 1986)
(allowing for treatment of a corporation's assets as non-capital assets if they would
have this character in the hands of a shareholder); I.R.C. § 1501 (West 1986) (permit-
ting certain affiliated groups of corporations to file a consolidated return).
See generally Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1949) (discussing that a taxpayer is
free to adopt any organization of his affairs as he may choose, and if he elects to do
business as a corporation he must accept the tax disadvantages). The government, nev-
ertheless, is not required to acquiesce in the taxpayer's election of that form for doing
business if it is most advantageous to the taxpayer. If the government determines that
the form employed of doing business or carrying out the tax event is unreal or a sham,
it is free to disregard the form of the established business organization and tax it, based
then on its substance so that it best serves the purposes of the tax statutes. Id. at 477.
82. See B. BITrKER & J. EUsTICE, supra note 73, at 1-14-1-22 (discussing the
factors determining when a transaction is at arm's length); O'Brien & Tung, supra
note 1, at 686-87 (discussing the characteristics of an arm's length transaction). Such
factors include reviewing the subsidiary's books, records, and other business informa-
tion in order to determine how the business operations are handled, how much indepen-
dence from the parent exists, whether the subsidiary is treated as a separate entity by
the shareholders, and whether the subsidiary's premiums are consistent with a profit-
making motive. Id. at 686. Also, the determination of a corporate entity involves the
assignment of earned income, the substance of an act over its form, its relative business
purposes and the integrative perspective of the step transactions. B. BITrKER & J. Eus-
TICE, supra note 73, at 1-18-1-22. Finally, if the subsidiary has no management respon-
sibilities, it may be inferred that the captive corporation is acting only as an agent or
nominee of the parent. Id.
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or business activity, the court may rule the subsidiary lacks indepen-
dence and refuse to regard it as a separate corporate entity. 83
B. RELEVANCE OF THE CORPORATE ENTITY DOCTRINE TO CAPTIVE
INSURANCE COMPANIES
The Internal Revenue Service relies exclusively on the economic
family concept to disallow the deduction of insurance payments to cap-
tive insurance companies. 4 Its reliance, however, fails to recognize ade-
quately the captive's independent corporate entity.85 Rather, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service focuses exclusively on the economics of the
captive-parent relationship. 6 Under the economic family analysis, the
insured parent corporation must rid itself of any economic stake in its
anticipated losses. Only then will the captive insurance company ap-
pear outside of the parent corporation's economic family and capable of
bearing the risks of loss shifted from the parent corporation to itself.
The corporate entity doctrine conflicts with the economic family
analysis. Pursuant to the corporate entity doctrine, premiums paid by a
parent corporation to its captive insurance company shift the risk of
loss unless a corporate entity doctrine exception applies. Revenue Rul-
ing 77-316 does not characterize captive insurance companies as sepa-
rate exceptions to the corporate entity doctrine. Rather, the Internal
Revenue Service merely acknowledges the Supreme Court's acceptance
of the doctrine in Moline Properties.7 The Court's interpretation of
the corporate entity doctrine, in Moline Properties, remains valid law
and warrants closer Internal Revenue Service attention to the question
of risk transfer from parent to captive insurance company.'
83. National Inv. Corp. v. Hoey, 144 F.2d 466, 467-68 (2d Cir. 1944), quoted in B.
BITTKER AND J. EUSTICE, supra note 73, at 1-17.
84. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2, C.B. 53, 54-55.
85. See id. (failing to fully state why the separate corporate entity doctrine was not
applied in Revenue Ruling 77-316); see also infra notes 156-59 and accompanying text
(discussing the consequences of ignoring the separate corporate entity doctrine).
86. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54-55.
87. Id. The analysis of Revenue Ruling 77-316 recognizes Sl, S2, and S3, as inde-
pendent corporate entities only to the extent that in view of their business activities, the
economic reality of each corporate situation will differ. Id.
88. See, e.g., National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 426 (1948)
(adhering to the decision in Moline Properties that a corporate entity must be the
entity taxed, rather than its shareholders, when it engages in "business activities");
Strick Corp. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1194, 1203-1204 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing several
cases that represent the separate corporate identity doctrine's "continuing validity" for
federal income tax purposes); Bennett Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 699 F.2d 450,
451-52 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming the continuing importance of the separate corporate
identity doctrine).
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IV. JUDICIAL VIEW OF CAPTIVE INSURANCE
COMPANIES
Carnation Co. v. Commissioner first analyzed risk shifting in captive
insurance companies." The United States Tax Court held that a parent
corporation was not entitled to a section 162 business expense deduc-
tion to the extent the captive insured the parent's risks.90 One year
later the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed. 1
In 1971, Carnation incorporated Three Flowers, a wholly-owned cap-
tive insurance company in Bermuda.2 Initially capitalized with
$120,000.00, Three Flowers promptly reinsured Carnation's and its
subsidiaries' various risks.93 Following Three Flowers' creation, Carna-
tion purchased a blanket insurance policy from American Home.9'
Three Flowers later reinsured 90 percent of American Home's liability
under Carnation's policy.9 5 The reinsurance arrangement required
American Home to pay Carnation's claims and subsequently seek reim-
bursement from Three Flowers.'
American Home expressed concern about Three Flowers' ability to
cover American Home's losses prior to entering into the reinsurance
arrangement.9 Although refusing to issue American Home a letter of
credit to secure Three Flowers' financial status, Carnation agreed to
capitalize Three Flowers with an additional $3,000,000.00. 8
The Internal Revenue Service determined that Carnation could not
89. See Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400, 401 (1977), afTd, 640 F.2d
1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (determining whether amounts paid
to an unrelated insurance company as insurance premiums and thereafter reinsured by
Carnation's wholly owned Bermuda insurance subsidiary are deductible as ordinary
and necessary business expenses).
90. Id. at 405.
91. See Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir.), (uphold-
ing the tax court decision but offering a different analysis in reaching that result) cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
92. Id. at 402. See generally TAX MGMT. (BNA) No. 433, at A-9 to A-Il (1983)
(describing a typical captive off-shore insurance arrangement).
93. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1977), aff'd, 640 F.2d 1010,
1013 (9th Cir.) (upholding the Tax Court decision), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
94. Id. at 402. American Home was a domestic insurance company that provided
insurance coverage for Carnation commencing September 22, 1971. Id. The insurance
coverage provided by American Home is referred to as a blanket insurance policy that
covers losses arising from fire, lightning, vandalism, malicious mischief, sprinkler leak-
age, flood, and earthquake shock. Id.
95. Id. at 403.
96. Id. Of the $1,195,000.00 paid from Carnation's annual premiums to American





deduct the reinsurance cost as a business expense paid to Three Flow-
ers.99 The Internal Revenue Service advanced four arguments to sup-
port disallowing Carnation its business deduction.100 The tax court,
however, based its decision on risk shifting, the first of the four argu-
ments.101 The tax court found that the agreements between Three
Flowers, American Home, and Carnation embodied no risk shifting 0 2
because Carnation would ultimately bear 99 percent of the risk of its
anticipated losses. 103 Further, since Americaq Home insured Carnation
only after Carnation agreed to further capitalize Three Flowers, the
risk of loss shifted. Three Flowers reimbursed Carnation's insurance
claim from the money Carnation used to capitalize Three Flowers.
Therefore, Carnation's risk of loss did not pass to Three Flowers. Car-
nation's agreement to capitalize fully its captive, Three Flowers, neu-
tralized any risk shift.1'
Following Carnation, several court decisions used the economic fam-
ily analysis to determine the presence of risk shifting in captive insur-
ance company cases.10 5 Two such cases, Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United
99. Id. at 405.
100. Id. at 405-06. First, the Internal Revenue Service attempted to define risk
shifting as an essential element of insurance. Id. The amount reinsured by the subsidi-
ary represents no risk shift. Id. Second, the Internal Revenue Service contended that no
deduction is allowed for amounts set aside as self-insurance. Id. Third, the Internal
Revenue Service argued that the amount ultimately received by Three Flowers was not
paid or incurred as defined by section 162, because the amounts paid remained within
Carnation's practical control. Id. Fourth, the insurance contract represented no ex-
change of value because Carnation ultimately bore the risk. Id.
101. Id. at 411.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 403.
104. Id. at 405. Although finding no risk shifting, the Tax Court did not use the
economic family analysis to come to its decision. Instead, the Tax Court focused on the
interdependence of the insurance contract between Carnation and Three Flowers and
Carnation's obligation to capitalize Three Flowers in order for Three Flowers to meet
its insurer obligations. The Tax Court determined that these two agreements together
neutralized any Carnation risk insured by Three Flowers. Id. at 410. Therefore, there
was no risk shifting.
The Circuit Court similarly found no risk shifting from Carnation to Three Flowers.
Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1977), aff'd, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981). The Circuit Court, however, fully adopted the
economic family analysis formulated in Revenue Ruling 77-316. Id. Instead, of focus-
ing on the relationship between the parent corporation and the captive insurance com-
pany based on the interdependence of the insurance contract and capitalization agree-
ment, the Circuit Court concluded that no risk shifted because the risk was retained by
a wholly-owned subsidiary of the parent corporation. Therefore, the risk was not trans-
ferred to a business entity outside of the parent corporation's economic family. Id.
105. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1977), ofd, 640 F.2d 1010
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Stearns-Roger Inc. v. Commissioner, 577
F. Supp. 833 (D. Colo. 1984), affid, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985); Crawford-Fitting
Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Clougherty Packing Co. v.
19871
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
States and Crawford-Fitting Co. v. United States, used the economic
family analysis but produced different results. In Stearns-Roger, the
court held that the parent corporation was not entitled to deduct insur-
ance. 0 6 In Crawford-Fitting the court permitted such a deduction. 10 7
Emphasis on different factors produced these different results.
In Stearns-Roger,10 8 the court focused on whether the captive insur-
ance company should be treated as a corporate entity distinct from the
parent corporation. 10 9 Although the court recognized that the two cor-
porations were separate entities, the court believed the corporations
were part of a single economic family because the captive insurance
company was a wholly-owned subsidiary of the parent." 0 Since both
corporations were in the same economic family, the mandatory risk
shifting for insurance purposes was not present."' Therefore, premium
payments made to such an insurance contract were not deductible as
Section 162 business expenses."'
In Crawford-Fitting, the court required the insured corporation to
shift the risk of loss to an insurer outside of the insured's economic
Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948 (1985).
106. Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States" 577 F. Supp. 833, 838 (D. Colo. 1984),
aff'd, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985).
107. Crawford-Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136, 148 (N.D. Ohio
1985).
108. Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 833, 834 (D. Colo. 1984),
aff'd, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985). Stearns-Roger found it expensive to maintain
traditional insurance policies, so it incorporated the captive insurance company to pro-
vide less expensive coverage. Id. The captive insurance company was incorporated as a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Stearns-Roger and capitalized by Stearns-Roger with
$1,000,000.00. Id. at 834-35.
The government first argued that there was no risk shifting because the premiums
paid by Stearns-Roger to its captive insurance company were self-insurance reserves.
Id. at 835. Additionally, such self-insurance premiums are not a deductible business
expense because the risk remains with the insured establishing the reinvestments. Id.
The government's second argument, which the court incorporated in its decision, stipu-
lated that because the captive insurance company was a wholly owned subsidiary of
Stearns-Roger, the premiums were simply a transfer of capital within the Stearns-
Roger family. Id. Therefore, just by the relationship of the insured and insurer, no risk
was shifted. Id.
109. Id. at 836. The court recognized that a corporate entity will not be disre-
garded if the corporation is formed for valid business purposes. Id. In addition, the
court further stated that wholly-owned subsidiaries may be separate taxpayers from
their parent corporation. Id. Nevertheless, the court went on to hold that because of the
relationship between the captive insurance company and Stearns-Roger, no risk shifting
can occur.
I10. Id.
S11. Id. at 838. The court concluded that the risk of loss remains within the parent
corporation's economic family because when the captive insurance company is a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the insured corporation, the insured corporation bears any




family. 13 Unlike Stearns-Roger, the court found that the insured cor-
poration shifted its risk of loss to its captive insurance company.1
Therefore, the court did not treat two separately incorporated entities
as a single economic family.115
The court in Crawford-Fitting used a four part analysis to determine
that the insured corporation transferred the risk of loss. 1 " First, the
insured corporation did not completely own the captive insurance com-
pany.117 Unlike the relationship between the insured corporation and
the captive insurance company in Stearns-Roger, the captive insurance
company in Crawford-Fitting was not a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
insured corporation."' 8 Second, the court found that the insured corpo-
ration incorporated the captive insurance company not for tax avoid-
ance, but for legitimate business purposes. 119 Third, the premiums
charged by the captive insurance company represented normal premi-
ums and were proportionate to the risks they covered.12 0 Finally, the
113. Crawford-Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136, 148 (N.D. Ohio
1985).
114. Id. at 149.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text (describing five elements of the
economic family analysis that must be viewed before determining whether an insured
corporation shifted the risk to its captive insurance company). The court in Crawford-
Fitting employed these various elements to decide the case. Crawford-Fitting Co. v.
United States, 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985). This marked a departure from the
economic family analysis applied in Stearns-Roger. In Stearns-Roger, the relationship
between the captive insurance company, a wholly owned subsidiary of the insured cor-
poration, and the insured corporation raised the presumption that the two corporations
were within the same economic family. Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 577 F.
Supp. 833 (D. Colo. 1984), affd, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985).
117. Crawford-Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136, 138 (N.D. Ohio
1985). The insured corporation was not the parent corporation of the captive insurance
company. Id. at 145. Crawford-Fitting Company, along with three other manufactur-
ers, manufacture and sell various products to four warehouses. Id. Each one of these
warehouses that distributes the manufactured goods are incorporated separately. Id.
These warehouses owned 80% of the captive insurance company's stock while several
directors of Crawford-Fitting Company owned the remaining 20%. Id. Although one
person owns 100% of Crawford-Fitting Company's stock and various percentages of the
warehouses' stock, the court found this fact inconsequential, noting that each corpora-
tion was independently incorporated pursuant to valid and legitimate business purposes.
Id. at 146.
118. See Crawford-Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136, 146 (N.D. Ohio
1985) (finding that the ownership of the captive insurance company was diversified to
the point that no one shareholder held more than a 20% ownership interest in the
captive insurance company).
119. Id. at 147. The court and both parties agreed to the stipulation that the cap-
tive insurance company was incorporated so that Crawford-Fitting Company could se-
cure insurance at more economical rates and without excessive restrictions on the types
and amounts of risks insured. Id. at 138.
120. Id. at 147. After entering into an insurance relationship with its captive insur-
ance company, Crawford-Fitting Company paid its premiums at the market rate. Id. at
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captive insured risks independent from the insured corporation's.121 For
these reasons, the court determined that the risk of loss shifted from
the insured corporation to the captive insurance company and the in-
surance premiums were valid business expenses. 122
From the series of cases commencing with Carnation, it is clear that
the courts used the economic family analysis to determine risk shifting.
Application of this analysis to captive insurance companies, however,
varies from case to case. In Carnation, the Tax Court focused on the
interdependence of the insurance contract and the capitalization agree-
ments.1 23 On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit affirmatively adopted
the economic family analysis set forth in Revenue Ruling 77-316.
Similarly, Stearns-Roger applied the economic family analysis looking
strictly at the relationship between the parent and captive insurance
company. 125 In Crawford-Fitting, however, the court determined that
the captive insurance company was not in the insured's economic fam-
ily after analyzing the nature of the relationship between the two cor-
porations and analyzing the financial and managerial independence of
the captive insurance company.
1 26
V. CURRENT JUDICIAL POSTURE ON CAPTIVE
OFFSHORE INSURANCE COMPANIES
A. MOBIL OIL CORPORATION V. UNITED STATES
In this recent case Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) sought a refund of
federal income taxes paid, together with interest, for the years 1961
through 1969.2 During those years, the Internal Revenue Service dis-
allowed deductions for insurance premium payments to Mobil's captive
insurance companies.128 In its decision, the United States Claims Court
139.
121. Id. at 147. The captive insurance company provided comprehensive general
liability and product liability insurance for approximately 45 companies associated with
Crawford-Fitting Company and 115 independent distributors, none of which are owned
by Crawford-Fitting Company. Id. at 138.
122. Id. at 147-48.
123. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400, 405 (1977), a.O'd, 640 F.2d
1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
124. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1977), aff'd, 640 F.2d 1010,
1013 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
125. Stearns-Roger Corp. v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 833, 836-38 (D. Colo.
1984), affid, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985).
126. See supra notes 116-22 and accompanying text (describing the factors the
court used in analyzing the nature of the captive insurance company in Crawford-
Fitting).
127. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 556 (1985).
128. See id. at 568 (concluding that Mobil was not entitled to a refund for disal-
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held that Mobil failed to shift the risk of loss to its captive insurance
company affiliates; a valid insurance agreement was not formed; and
therefore, Mobil could not claim a business expense deduction for those
payments.
129
Prior to 1960 Mobil protected itself and its affiliates, such as Mobil
Overseas,130 from major property and casualty risks through self insur-
ance."' Subsequently, questions arose within Mobil concerning the ef-
fectiveness of employing a self-insurance program for insuring Mobil's
foreign affiliates.13 2 These problems came to the attention of Mobil Oil
in the "Adam's Report."1 33 The suggestions set forth in the Adam's
Report led directly to the incorporation of the General Overseas Insur-
ance Company, Limited ("GOIC"), which eventually was replaced by
Bluefield Insurance Limited ("Bluefield"); both wholly-owned insur-
ance affiliates organized in the Bahamas and Bermuda", to insure cer-
tain risks of Mobil and its affiliates."3 5 Mobil insured 100 percent of its
lowed deductions of insurance premiums paid to Mobil's captive insurance companies).
129. See id. at 567 (stating that absent a shift in the risk of loss Mobil's use of a
captive insurance company is an extension of Mobil's self-insurance policy).
130. See id. at 556-57 (providing Mobil Overseas with the power to offer financial
aid and advice to all Mobil Oil's affiliates). In 1951 Mobil Overseas Oil Company, Inc.
(Mobil Overseas) was organized as a wholly-owned domestic subsidiary of Mobil Oil to
coordinate the overseas activities at Mobil's affiliates. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 557-58. Such questions concerned the adequacy of protection present in
self-insurance programs, the cost efficiency of employing a self-insurance program, and
the ability to centralize more effectively Mobil Oil's insurance coverage. Id.
133. Id. The Adam's Report concluded that the methods of Mobil Overseas and its
affiliates of insuring their risks should be revised. The Mobil Overseas policy of self-
insurance was not being followed by its affiliates because of their inability to generate
sufficient self-insurance reserves. The report recommended that an insurance affiliate be
formed to provide insurance for Mobil Overseas affiliates. Id.; Plaintiff's Post-Trial
Brief at 7, Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985).
The report recognized advantages to switching to the use of a captive insurance com-
pany. One such benefit was the cost savings in regards to tax savings and retaining the
profit of the insurance transaction within the group. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States,
8 Cl. Ct. 555, 557-58 (1985); Defendant's Brief at 8, Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States,
8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985). In anticipation of these savings, the board of directors of Mobil
Overseas and its affiliates approved the report. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl.
Ct. 555, 558 (1985).
134. Id. at 558-59. GOIC and Bluefield were separate corporations whose employ-
ees and offices were located in the Bahamas and Bermuda. Id. Each corporation was
managed according to standard insurance practices while writing both direct insurance
and reinsurance of United States and foreign risks. Id. at 559.
135. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 558-59 (1985). GOIC was
organized as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mobil Holdings, Ltd., a Bahamian corpora-
tion wholly-owned by Mobil Overseas. Id. Eventually, Mobil Holdings became a direct
subsidiary of Mobil Oil. Id. GOIC remained a subsidiary of Mobil Holdings until polit-
ical instability forced the liquidation of GOIC. Id. At the beginning of 1968, Bluefield
commenced writing insurance and reinsurance previously written by GOIC. Id. at 559.
Bluefield was incorporated in Bermuda as a subsidiary of Holdings S.A., a Luxem-
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catastrophe risk through these companies.13 6 Additionally, Mobil Over-
seas affiliates obtained loans with funds accumulated by GOIC and
Bluefield.13 7 Therefore, GOIC and Bluefield provided Mobil Oil with a
more efficient insurance program and an added source of funds for
reinvestment.
138
The majority of Mobil Overseas affiliates either insured their risks
directly with GOIC or Bluefield or with an independent insurance com-
pany that in turn reinsured with GOIC or Bluefield. 39 Thereafter, a
corporate policy developed obligating GOIC and Bluefield to reinsure
policies between a primary insurer and Mobil or an affiliate.140 GOIC
and Bluefield normally did not reinsure the risks of parties other than
Mobil or its affiliates unless the risks bore some relationship to the bus-
iness activities of Mobil and its affiliates.' 4 '
In Mobil Oil the Claims Court examined whether Mobil sufficiently
transferred its risk of loss to GOIC and Bluefield so as to create a valid
insurance agreement." Applying the prior case analysis that decided
the deductibility of insurance premiums paid to captive insurance com-
panies, 43 the Claims Court held insufficient risk existed to constitute
insurance, and therefore, the premiums were not deductible as an ordi-
nary and necessary business expense.14 4 The Claims Court focused on
the interdependence of the insurance contracts and Mobil's contractual
obligation to capitalize the captive insurance company. 145
In concluding that Mobil did not sufficiently shift the risk of loss, the
Claims Court employed the economic family analysis. 46 The court
stated that Mobil should finance any losses GOIC or Bluefield suffered,
bourg corporation. Id. Bluefield maintained its offices in Hamilton, Bermuda and re-
mained a subsidiary of Mobil Oil Holdings through 1969. Id. Mobil Oil indirectly
owned all of the stock of Mobil Oil Holdings. Id.
136. Id. This was never possible in the past because of the high risk industries in
which Mobil Oil was engaged. See supra note 32 (discussing high risk industries).
137. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 559-60 (1985).
138. Id. at 567.
139. Id. at 562.
140. Id. at 563. In 1960, Mobil Oil began insuring its United States risks with
AIRCO, an unrelated domestic insurance company, which almost entirely reinsured
with GOIC. Id. The AIRCO representative who negotiated the agreement testified that
he did not fully investigate GOIC's financial status because of its status with Mobil
Oil. Id. Therefore, AIRCO never requested a letter of credit from Mobil Oil. Id. at
561. Bluefield entered into a similar agreement with AIRCO upon GOIC's liquidation.
Id. at 560-62.
141. Id. at 561.
142. Id. at 563.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 568.




and that Mobil should benefit from any profits realized by the affiliates,
and that Mobil's financial statements should reflect any gain or loss. 147
In addition, other Mobil Oil affiliates could receive a percentage of the
profits and insurance reserves held by GOIC and Bluefield as funds for
investment and credit purposes.1 48 The Claims Court concluded Mobil
did not shift the risk to its insurance affiliates because the premiums
paid by Mobil remained within the same economic family and the
funds used to reimburse casualty losses would originate from within the
same economic family.
B. MOBIL OIL ANALYSIS
Mobil Oil reaffirmed the economic family analysis determining
whether an indemnification agreement with a parent's captive insur-
ance company successfully transfers the risk of loss required by Le
Gierse.149 Mere reliance on the economic family analysis, however, is
an insufficient method to evaluate captive insurance companies because
it: (1) ignores the separate corporate entity doctrine; (2) disregards the
valid business purposes for establishing captive insurance companies;
and (3) focuses on the wrong evidentiary materials.16 0 Alternatively,
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 56-72 and 89-126 and accompanying text (discussing the in-
ception of the economic family analysis in Revenue Ruling 77-316 and its judicial use
in cases involving captive insurance companies commencing with Carnation Co. v.
Commissioner). During its analysis of the deductibility of insurance premiums paid to
captive insurance companies, the Claims Court discussed the holdings in many cases to
determine what sufficiently shifts the risk of loss to constitute insurance for federal
income tax purposes. Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 400 (1977), aff'd, 640
F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Stearns-Roger Corp., Inc. v.
United States, 577 F. Supp. 833 (D. Colo. 1984), aff/d, 774 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1985);
Crawford-Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Clough-
erty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948 (1985).
150. The Claims Court adopted the economic family analysis applied in Carnation
and Stearns-Roger. This application looks solely at some parent corporation-subsidiary
link. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (describing the two forms of eco-
nomic family analysis). Mobil Oil, however, is more similar to Crawford-Fitting. In
Mobil Oil, the captive insurance company was not a subsidiary of Mobil Oil. Instead,
Mobil Oil's captive insurance companies were subsidiaries of Mobil Oil Holdings, a
Luxembourg corporation. Mobil Oil only indirectly owned its captive insurance compa-
nies. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 558-60 (1985). Furthermore,
GOIC and Bluefield insured risks of many corporations affiliated with Mobil Oil that
were separate corporations and not wholly-owned by Mobil Oil. Id. Therefore, the eco-
nomic family analysis of Crawford-Fitting that analyzes the nature of the captive in-
surance company is a more appropriate economic family analysis for this case. See
supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (describing benefits of this second type of
analysis).
Although the Crawford-Fitting form of economic analysis is more applicable than
the Stearns-Roger form, use of Section 482 to analyze the deductibility of insurance
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Section 482 of the Tax Code offers a more effective means than the
economic family analysis for evaluating Mobil's business deduction for
insurance premiums paid to its captive insurance company.
15 1
1. Mobil Oil Ignored the Corporate Entity Doctrine
In Mobil Oil the Claims Court stated that if it disregards the sepa-
rate corporate entities, the court is simply reclassifying the transac-
tion.1 52 No further cases attempt to reconcile the corporate entity doc-
trine with the economic family analysis.
Further, the facts of Mobil Oil, as compared to Carnation, suffi-
ciently differ to justify arguing against the use of the economic family
analysis. GOIC and Bluefield separated themselves further from Mo-
bil's identity than Three Flowers separated itself from Carnation's
identity in Carnation. In contrast with the Three Flowers and Carna-
tion arrangements, Mobil's insurance affiliates used independent man-
agement, operated an international insurance business insuring all Mo-
bil subsidiaries, and engaged in a high business volume.10 3 These
factors illustrate Mobil Oil's intent to maintain a corporate identity
separate from GOIC and Bluefield.1 " Therefore, the economic family
analysis created a "family" where no "family" was intended. 5 '
premiums is more effective because it offers the Internal Revenue Service more free-
dom to consider all aspects of a transaction. See infra notes 161-71 and accompanying
text (setting forth the benefits of a Section 482 analysis).
151. See Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 39-40, Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8
CL. Ct. 555 (1985) (suggesting that the Internal Revenue Service should use Section
482 in this case to determine if the transaction in question meets an arm's length stan-
dard rather than focusing on a Revenue Ruling 77-316 economic family approach); but
see Defendant's Brief at 94-99, Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555 (1985)
(arguing that Section 482 is not the proper means to decide this case because the sole
issue is whether or not the captive insurance arrangement is insurance).
152. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 567 (1985). The court dis-
pensed with the separate entity doctrine by stating that insurance premiums paid to
captive insurance companies do not totally disregard the separate nature of corporate
entities. Id. In effect, however, the court is reclassifying a transaction including two
separate corporations as one involving solely one corporation. Id. In the Claims Court
opinion, Section 482 was never mentioned or discussed as an alternative basis to decide
Mobil Oil. Id.
153. See id. at 558-60 (discussing the hierarchy of Mobil Oil subsidiaries and their
respective responsibilities); see also supra notes 92-98 (describing the lack of autonomy
of Carnation's captive insurance company in Carnation Co. v. Commissioner).
154. Id. The decision in Mobil Oil failed to discuss the relevance, if any, of the
intent of the taxpayer in incorporating a captive insurance company and deducting the
insurance premiums paid to the captive insurance company. Id.
155. In Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner 84 T.C. 948 (1985), the Tax
Court held that insurance premiums paid to the petitioner's wholly-owned captive in-
surance subsidiary are not deductible by the petitioner as an ordinary and necessary
business expense. Id. at 955. Although the tax court stated that it did not employ the
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2. Mobil Oil Disregarded Valid Business Purposes
Mobil Oil also disregarded the valid business purposes embodied in a
captive insurance company.56 The Adam's Report recommended the
creation of a captive insurance company to monitor effectively the risks
of Mobil and its affiliates. 157 Nonrecognition of these valid business
reasons creates the unavoidable inference that the sole acquisitional
purpose of the insurance affiliates is avoidance of federal income taxes.
Premiums paid to a captive insurance company, therefore, are not de-
ductible once it is found that the insured and insurer are in the same
economic family.158 Unfortunately, this inference conflicts with the no-
tion that tax benefits often co-exist with the many valid business pur-
poses of insuring through a captive.1 59
economic family analysis in its decision, the opinion still appears to apply an economic
family approach. Id. The Tax Court found that the risk of loss did not shift from the
petitioner to the captive insurance company because the corporations were two related
parties. Id. at 954. This finding assumes that the risk of loss cannot shift between two
related corporate entities, i.e. a parent and subsidiary. This theory, however, is essen-
tially the economic family analysis.
The dissent in Clougherty cited the majority's failure to appreciate the corporate
entity doctrine. Id. at 958. The dissent viewed the majority opinion as a form of the
economic family theory. Id. Instead of creating a strict economic family rule which
would "automatically preclude insurance between related entities," the dissent wanted
to create a more flexible rule that would analyze a captive insurance company as more
than an economic family member. Such a flexible rule would not disregard the separate
corporate entity doctrine in the eyes of the dissent. Furthermore, the dissent argued
that application of the economic family rationale will cause confusion in captive insur-
ance cases with unique sets of facts. Id. Therefore, the dissent argued for a new theory
to test the deductibility of insurance premiums paid to a captive insurance company.
156. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text (describing business purposes
for establishing a captive insurance company).
157. Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 555, 562-63 (1985). The following
reasons compelled Mobil Oil to organize a captive insurance company:
1. eliminating expensive or inadequate local insurance coverage of Mobil Over-
seas affiliates and providing coverage for major risks which were not adequately
protected;
2. providing a means whereby Mobil Overseas affiliates could pool their premi-
ums and thereby obtain protection against loss;
3. pooling the mass purchasing power of Mobil Overseas affiliates in an insur-
ance affiliate which would be able to obtain broad catastrophe coverage at low
cost;
4. creating a centralized insurance program which would broaden, simplify and
coordinate the insurance coverage of Mobil Overseas affiliates while at the same
time reducing their premium costs; and
5. avoiding the administrative costs normally reflected in commercial insurance
premiums to make money in the insurance business.
Id.
158. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing the economic family
analysis).
159. See Alinco Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 336, 341-45 (Cl. Ct.
1967) (observing that the presence of tax benefits in a particular business transaction
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3. Mobil Oil Focused on the Wrong Evidentiary Factors
The final weakness in the decision in Mobil Oil is the excessive reli-
ance of the court on the capitalization agreement between Mobil and
GOIC. A parent normally incorporates a subsidiary with adequate cap-
italization to commence that subsidiary's business.1 60 Capitalization
agreements usually accomplish this task. Because the purpose of the
agreements is to detail the relationship between a parent and subsidi-
ary, inevitably the two bodies do not appear separate within the corpus
of the agreement, despite being separate corporate entities.
The weakness of the decision in Mobil Oil points to the need for a
different analysis to determine whether a valid transfer of risk oc-
curred: one that looks beyond the formal parent-subsidiary relationship
to the existence of valid business purposes. Section 482 of the Internal
Revenue Code involves this more equitable analysis.161 To clearly re-
flect an organizations' income, section 482 grants the Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service discretionary power to allocate gross in-
come, deductions, credits, or allowances among organizations within an
economic network. 162 Pursuant to section 482, if two or more business
organizations are owned directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Commissioner may distribute the deductions claimed by the parent cor-
poration.1 6 This is true even in the absence of tax avoidance mo-
tives.'" This distribution, exercised in the Commissioner's discretion, is
does not constitute tax avoidance).
160. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 356 (1983) (stating
that a parent corporation will adequately capitalize its subsidiary to treat the two cor-
porations as separate corporations in order for the parent corporation to limit its liabil-
ity as the sole shareholder of its subsidiary).
161. See B. BITTKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 73, at 15-15 (describing section 482
as a primary means for the Internal Revenue Service to police the propriety of transac-
tions between parents and affiliated corporations).
162. I.R.C. § 482 (West 1986). Section 482 provides that:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the
Secretary may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits,
or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in
order to prevent evasions of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades, or businesses.
Id.
163. Id.
164. See Rev. Proc. 70-8, 1970-1 C.B. 434, 434 (advising the Internal Revenue
Service to consider the effects of a particular transaction between two members of a
group of controlled entities for purposes of applying section 482); see also Treas. Reg.
1.482-1(c) (authorizing the Internal Revenue Service to analyze the tax avoidance mo-
tives of a particular transaction).
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necessary to prevent tax avoidance.'"
Use of section 482 would impose on the parent corporation a rebutta-
ble presumption that the captive insurance company was created for
tax avoidance purposes. 6" To rebut this presumption, the parent must
prove the captive is a separate taxable entity.107 The parent corporation
would also receive the opportunity to demonstrate the captive was not
established for tax avoidance purposes by offering valid business pur-
poses for insuring through the captive. 68
Furthermore, analysis under section 482 permits courts greater flexi-
bility in approaching this problem. The economic family analysis limits
a court's view of a captive insurance arrangement. If a captive insur-
ance company is within a parent corporation's economic family, then
insurance premiums paid to the captive insurance company are not de-
ductible by the parent corporation. 6 9 The presence of valid business
motives or the intent to operate the captive insurance company as a
separate business entity are not given adequate consideration in judicial
opinions.1
7 0
Under section 482, judicial analysis of captive insurance companies
is broader and focuses on the separate corporate identity doctrine. The
taxpayer bears the burden to demonstrate that both it and the captive
insurance company exist independently and that valid business reasons
165. See Oil Base Inc. v. Commissioner, 362 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1967) (disallowing deductions for commissions paid by a parent
corporation to a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary under section 482 because the com-
missions were twice the amount paid to unrelated parties for similar services).
166. See Rev. Proc. 70-8, 1970-1 C.B. 434, 435 (placing the burden of proof on the
taxpayer to justify a deduction being examined by the Internal Revenue Service
through section 482).
167. See Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief at 23-30, Mobil Oil Corp. v. United States, 8
Cl. Ct. 555 (1985) (arguing that the captive insurance company is a separate taxable
entity thus attempting to defeat an Internal Revenue Service attack on Mobil Oil's
captive insurance company).
168. See Rev. Proc. 70-8, 1970-1 C.B. 434, 434 (requiring the taxpayer to demon-
strate existence of a proper business arrangement); see also Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(c)
(stating that an Internal Revenue Service district director has the authority to perform
the following: determine if a business transaction is a sham transaction designed to
reduce or avoid taxes by distorting income; and determine whether two taxpayers are
dealing at arm's length and are not attempting to use the same tax deduction or credit
twice). Proper organization of the captive will accomplish the arm's length separation.
Specifically, proper organization includes creation of the captive for valid business pur-
poses; maintenance of separate offices, records, and decision-making officers; some re-
tention of assets; and, effective transferral of risk. Provided these elements can be
shown by the parent, the presumption of tax avoidance may be lifted. Id.
169. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text (discussing the application of
the economic family approach to captive insurance companies).
170. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 73, at 15-6 - 15-9 (discussing arm's
length analysis).
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caused the parent to form the captive insurance company.171 Assuming
the parent corporation meets this burden, it may deduct insurance pre-
miums paid to a captive insurance company. This approach allows a
court to review a captive insurance agreement with a wider scope and
escape the strict rule of the economic family analysis.
VI. CONCLUSION
The numerous business purposes of captive insurance companies
guarantee their use in the years to come.172 The deductibility of insur-
ance premiums paid to a captive insurance companies, however, does
not face as secure a future.
The Internal Revenue Service and the courts, through the economic
family analysis, disallow insurance premium deductions when the pre-
mium is paid from a parent corporation to a subsidiary captive insur-
ance company. This analysis, however, possesses several flaws. It ig-
nores the separate corporate entity doctrine and the valid business
reasons for creating a captive insurance company. Therefore, an alter-
native approach toward captive insurance companies could more effec-
tively evaluate the deductibility of premiums paid to them.
Such an alternative approach is section 482. This section allows the
Internal Revenue Service greater discretion to view all factors associ-
ated with a captive insurance company rather than solely its relation-
ship to its parent corporation. If such a new approach is employed,
insurance premiums made to a captive insurance company may become
deductible.
171. 5 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1 2993.01 (1985).
172. Crawford-Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985);
Rev. Rul. 78-338, 1978-2, C.B. 107. In Crawford-Fitting Co., the district court held
that the amounts paid to a captive insurance as insurance premiums may be deductible
as business expenses under section 162. Id. The district court allowed the deduction
paid to the captive because the captive was: established for valid business purposes; a
separate and independent corporate entity; and, also because the insured corporation
was not the parent. Crawford-Fitting Co. v. United States, 606 F. Supp. 136, 147
(N.D. Ohio 1985).
Revenue Ruling 78-338, which distinguished Revenue Ruling 77-316, allowed the
premium payment to a captive insurance company owned by 31 shareholders where no
single shareholder held a controlling interest. Rev. Rul. 78-338, 1978-2 C.B. 107. In
Revenue Ruling 78-338 a domestic corporation with foreign subsidiaries establishes a
captive offshore insurance company. Id. The captive is owned by 31 unrelated parties
and the captive only provides insurance for those 31 shareholders. The IRS ruled that
payments to such a captive are deductible under section 162. Id. at 108.
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